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INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution contains many enumerated grants of congres-
sional power.  Some of these grants, such as the Commerce Clause,1 
are extremely broad and contain no real limitations.  Other grants, 
such as the Bankruptcy Clause2 and the Copyright Clause,3 are much 
narrower, concerning a specific type of law and limiting Congress’s 
power to legislate.  Some laws concern both a broad and a narrow 
grant of power.  In the situations where constitutional grants of  
authority appear to overlap, both are relevant in determining whether 
the Constitution grants Congress authority to pass a law. 
Laws enacted under these circumstances raise an important and 
difficult question of constitutional interpretation:  when an enume-
 
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”).   
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress to enact “uniform Laws 
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”). 
3 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
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rated grant of power specifically addresses the realm of conduct that 
Congress seeks to regulate but limits Congress’s authority to act, can 
Congress instead act under a broader, alternative grant of power?  
This complicated issue has been termed the problem of inter-clause 
conflicts.4  The Supreme Court has confronted inter-clause conflicts 
on only a handful of occasions in a variety of contexts, and it has been 
inconsistent in its method of analysis, arriving at what some courts and 
commentators consider to be contradictory conclusions.  As a result, 
lower courts have been left with little guidance on how to proceed in 
the rare circumstances when this important question arises. 
One of these circumstances is the relationship between the Copy-
right Clause and the Commerce Clause.  Laws passed by Congress in 
1994 that outlaw the “bootlegging” (i.e., the recording, trading, and 
selling) of live musical performances present an inter-clause conflict.  
Congress enacted the bootlegging ban in two forms:  a civil provision, 
which Congress added as Chapter 11 of the Copyright Act,5 and a 
criminal provision.6  The statutes were included as part of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act (URAA),7 which Congress enacted in order to 
comply with the United States’ obligations under the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs),8 a massive intellectual prop-
erty treaty.9  The civil anti-bootlegging provision states that: 
 
4 See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Resolving Conflicts Among Congress’s Powers Regarding Statutes’ 
Constitutionality:  The Case of Anti-Bootlegging Statutes, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 468-69 
(2007) (describing the tension between congressional authority under the Commerce 
and Copyright Clauses as an “inter-clause conflict”). 
5 See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006) (treating unauthorized recordings of live perfor-
mances as equivalent to traditional copyright infringement). 
6 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (authorizing up to five years in prison, fines, and forfeiture 
of equipment for first bootlegging offenses).   
7 Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15, 17, 19, and 35 U.S.C.). 
8 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, at Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 
108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 
9 The history of the anti-bootlegging statutes, the URAA, and TRIPs is complex.  
As Melville and David Nimmer explain,  
 In 1994, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act added to the picture a very brief 
Chapter 11, consisting of only one section.  That section regulates the unau-
thorized fixation and trafficking in sound recordings and music videos. . . . In 
order to comply with the obligations of the United States as a signatory to the 
TRIPs annex to the World Trade Organization Agreement, Congress added 
this protection for such performances. 
3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8E.01[B] (2010) 
(footnotes omitted); see also Craig W. Mandell, Balance of Powers:  Recognizing the Uru-
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Anyone who, without the consent of the performer or performers  
involved— 
(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance 
in a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces copies or phonorecords of 
such a performance from an unauthorized fixation, 
(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the sounds or 
sounds and images of a live musical performance, or 
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents or offers 
to rent, or traffics in any copy or phonorecord fixed as described in pa-
ragraph (1), regardless of whether the fixations occurred in the United 
States, 
shall be subject to the remedies provided in sections 502 through 505, to 
the same extent as an infringer of copyright.
10
 
 
guay Round Agreement Act’s Anti-Bootlegging Provisions as a Constitutional Exercise of Con-
gress’s Commerce Clause Authority, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 673, 678-83 (2007) (pro-
viding a detailed history of American anti-bootlegging statutes and the international 
agreements that preceded them).   
 The URAA’s relationship to TRIPs may implicate a theoretical issue of Congress’s 
authority under the treaty power.  Had the anti-bootlegging statutes been passed to 
enforce a ratified treaty, a very difficult and interesting question regarding the effect of 
the treaty power on other constitutional limitations (here, the limitations of the Copy-
right Clause) would have arisen.  See generally Caroline T. Nguyen, Note, Expansive Copy-
right Protection for All Time?  Avoiding Article I Horizontal Limitations Through the Treaty 
Power, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1079 (2006) (arguing that the anti-bootlegging statutes are 
constitutional under the treaty power and that an analysis of the conflict between the 
Copyright Clause and Commerce Clause is unnecessary). 
 This argument, however, ignores the complexity of the URAA’s history.  One can 
reach the issue of Congress’s authority under the treaty power only if there is a valid 
treaty on which the power can be invoked.  The Senate never ratified TRIPs; rather, 
Congress elected merely to comply with TRIPs through domestic legislation:   
Chapter 11 implements the TRIPs protocol, which in turn mandates com-
pliance with selected provisions of the Rome Convention [to which] [t]he 
United States does not adhere . . . . And Congress explicitly decided not to ra-
tify any treaty when it enacted the [URAA], concluding that all that needed to 
be done was accomplished by the domestic legislation.  There is therefore no 
treaty on which to hang an invocation of treaty authority.  
3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra, § 8E.05[A] (footnotes omitted); see also 4 NIMMER & NIM-
MER, supra, § 18.06[C][3][b] (“Both the Administration and Congress proceeded on 
the basis that all that needed to be accomplished was effectuated through the [URAA] 
itself; no treaty was presented to the Senate for United States accession.”).  Thus, it ap-
pears highly questionable whether the treaty power serves as an alternative constitu-
tional basis for Congress to enact the URAA.  This theoretical and underdeveloped 
constitutional question goes well beyond the scope of this Comment but is worthy of 
exploration in future scholarship. 
10 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a). 
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The criminal anti-bootlegging provision is identical in its applica-
tion, except that it adds an additional requirement:  that the actions 
be taken “knowingly and for purposes of commercial advantage or 
private financial gain.”11 
The anti-bootlegging statutes provide a perfect model for con-
fronting the question of constitutional inter-clause conflicts.  Al-
though Congress passed both provisions to comply with an intellectual 
property treaty and placed the civil provision within the same title as 
the Copyright Act, the anti-bootlegging statutes depart from tradition-
al copyright law in a number of respects.  First, the protections the sta-
tutes offer are very similar to copyright, yet they do not provide the 
full protections and rights that traditional copyright law affords.12  
Second, and more importantly, the anti-bootlegging statutes concern 
unfixed performances, and the rights the statutes grant are perpe-
tual.13  This is unlike all prior federal copyright laws in American his-
tory.14  Fixation and a limited term of protection are widely regarded 
as requirements for protection under the Copyright Clause.15  It thus 
appears highly probable that if the anti-bootlegging statutes are ex-
amined solely under the Copyright Clause (i.e., without regard to oth-
er constitutional provisions), they will be found unconstitutional.  
However, because the trading or selling of recordings of live musical 
performances undoubtedly affects interstate and foreign commerce, if 
the anti-bootlegging statutes are viewed solely under the Commerce 
 
11 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a). 
12 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8E.03[B][1] (“The unfixed musical per-
formances protected under Chapter 11 are accorded something approximating, but 
not equaling, copyright protection.”). 
13 See id. § 8E.01[B] (“Chapter 11 relates solely to unfixed matters.”); id. 
§ 8E.03[C][3] (noting possible constitutional objections to the statute’s grant of 
perpetual rights). 
14 See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 313-81 (7th ed. 2006) (providing an over-
view of the duration and termination of terms of protection under American copyright 
law); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8E.01[B] (“The federalization of control over 
unfixed productions departs from several centuries of American jurisprudence, given 
that regulation of activities lacking fixation has traditionally been the realm of state law 
protection.  In that sense, this last chapter represents a greater departure from constitu-
tional moorings than the predecessor additions.” (footnotes omitted)). 
15 See, e.g., 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 1.08[C][2] (“[I]n order for a work 
to constitute a writing, it must be embodied in some tangible form.  If the word ‘writ-
ings’ is to be given any meaning whatsoever, it must, at the very least, denote ‘some 
material form, capable of identification and having a more or less permanent endur-
ance.’” (footnote omitted)); see also generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199-208 
(2003) (analyzing whether the Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutionally 
grants perpetual rights). 
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Clause (i.e., without regard to the Copyright Clause), they will likely 
be deemed constitutional.  Therefore, the anti-bootlegging statutes 
present an apt example for exploring inter-clause conflicts and for 
analyzing potential solutions to that problem. 
A handful of courts have ruled on the constitutionality of the anti-
bootlegging statutes and have addressed the constitutional inter-
clause conflict question.  In some cases, courts have addressed the 
criminal provision’s constitutionality, reaching different conclusions 
using different reasoning.  In cases addressing the civil provision’s 
constitutionality, courts have also reached different conclusions us-
ing different reasoning.  A number of commentators have taken is-
sue with these decisions and their methods of analysis, some propos-
ing alternative approaches. 
In this Comment, I offer a method of constitutional analysis that I 
have termed “holistic categorization” as a possible solution to the 
problem of constitutional inter-clause conflicts.  This method is 
grounded in a view of the Constitution as an entity greater than the 
sum of its parts, in which the relationship between clauses must be 
considered in its interpretation.  I propose a two-step analysis under 
this approach.  First, it must be determined whether the statute at is-
sue falls within the scope of a given constitutional power.  This deter-
mination relies upon a general conception of the scope of the relevant 
clause based upon its text and underlying policy.  It also requires an 
understanding of what the statute at issue directly does, as well as the 
statute’s legislative history and construction.  Second, once the applica-
ble constitutional powers have been identified, it must be determined 
whether the statute violates the constitutional limitations upon those 
powers.  This method comports with Supreme Court precedent and, 
when applied to the anti-bootlegging statutes, finds that the statutes are 
unconstitutional under the limitations of the Copyright Clause. 
In Part I of this Comment, I will introduce and discuss the ap-
proaches to inter-clause conflicts that courts have taken in the context 
of the anti-bootlegging statutes, as well as the Supreme Court opinions 
to which these courts have looked for guidance outside of the boot-
legging context.  In Part II, I present my own categorization of the var-
ious existing and proposed approaches to inter-clause conflicts, pro-
viding other scholars’ commentary on the approaches and offering 
my own criticisms.  In Part III, I offer holistic categorization as a new 
method of constitutional interpretation for inter-clause conflicts.  I 
present the approach in detail and justify each of its rules and factors, 
grounding the approach in well-established, fundamental principles 
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of constitutional interpretation.  Finally, in Part IV I apply holistic ca-
tegorization to the anti-bootlegging statutes and find that the statutes 
are unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause. 
I.  JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO THE ANTI-BOOTLEGGING STATUTES 
Five federal district and circuit courts have discussed the specific 
question of whether the anti-bootlegging statutes violate the Copy-
right Clause.  Some cases address the criminal provision, and others 
address the civil provision.  Although two district courts held the pro-
visions to be unconstitutional (one addressing the criminal provision 
and the other the civil provision), both decisions were later reversed.  
In all five of the opinions, the courts looked to essentially the same 
Supreme Court precedent for guidance on how to approach the con-
stitutional question of overlapping enumerated powers, but each in-
terpreted the Court’s decisions somewhat differently.  In this Part, I 
discuss each opinion in turn. 
A.  The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision in Moghadam 
The first court to address the constitutionality of either anti-
bootlegging statute was the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Mogha-
dam, which held the criminal anti-bootlegging statute to be a valid ex-
ercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.16  In the 
case, Ali Moghadam was indicted for violating the anti-bootlegging 
statute.17  His motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the 
statute was unconstitutional was denied, and he pled guilty to the 
crime.18  On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, he again raised the issue 
of constitutionality.19 
In its opinion, the court addressed whether the statute could be a 
valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause.  In 
doing so, the court looked only to the generally accepted fixation re-
quirement (interpreted from the term “Writings” in the Clause), 
which was the sole ground upon which Moghadam argued unconstitu-
tionality.20  Although the court acknowledged the anti-bootlegging sta-
 
16 175 F.3d 1269, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). 
17 Id. at 1271. 
18 Id. at 1271-73.  In denying Moghadam’s motion to dismiss, the district court 
does not appear to have issued a written opinion explaining its ruling. 
19 Id. 
20 See id. at 1273 (“Of these limitations, Moghadam has relied in the instant case 
only on the concept of ‘fixation’ which is said to be embedded in the term ‘Writ-
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tute’s potential conflict with the Clause, the court declined to decide 
the question and chose instead to assume arguendo that the Copy-
right Clause was not a valid source of congressional authority to pass 
the anti-bootlegging statute.21 
Proceeding on this assumption, the court considered whether the 
statute could instead fall within Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
and foreign commerce under the Commerce Clause.22  The court de-
termined that, although Congress believed it was acting under the 
Copyright Clause and included “no jurisdictional element as is com-
monly found in criminal statutes passed under authority of the Com-
merce Clause,” the statute was nonetheless a valid exercise of the 
Commerce Clause.23  The court explained that “[t]he link between 
bootleg compact discs and interstate commerce and commerce with 
foreign nations is self-evident.”24 
After setting the stage, the court moved to the fundamental ques-
tion of constitutional interpretation:  “whether Congress can use its 
Commerce Clause power to avoid the limitations that might prevent it 
from passing the same legislation under the Copyright Clause.”25  The 
court stated as a rule of constitutional interpretation: 
 In general, the various grants of legislative authority contained in the 
Constitution stand alone and must be independently analyzed.  In other 
words, each of the powers of Congress is alternative to all of the other 
powers, and what cannot be done under one of them may very well be 
doable under another.
26
 
As support for this proposition, the court offered the Supreme 
Court’s influential decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States.27  In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Supreme Court considered the 
 
ings.’”).  Interestingly, in a footnote, the court wrote that the anti-bootlegging statutes 
may violate the “limited Times” requirement of the Copyright Clause, but declined to 
decide the question because the issue had not been preserved on appeal.  Id. at 1274 n.9. 
21 See id. at 1274 (acknowledging appellant’s fixation-requirement argument and 
declining to address the issue because the court found an alternative source of power 
for the enactment). 
22 Id. at 1274-82. 
23 Id. at 1275-77. 
24 Id. at 1275-76. 
25 Id. at 1277. 
26 Id. 
27 See id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)) 
(identifying the Heart of Atlanta Motel opinion as “[p]erhaps the most prominent ex-
ample of this principle”). 
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constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,28 which prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin 
in particular classes of businesses that serve the public.29  More than 
eighty years earlier, in the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court had 
struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as unconstitutional because 
Congress lacked authority to pass the law under either the Thirteenth 
or Fourteenth Amendments—the only sources of authority under 
which the government argued.30  In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Su-
preme Court distinguished the Civil Rights Cases decision on multiple 
grounds31 and held the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to be a constitutional 
exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.32  To sup-
port its rule of constitutional interpretation, the Moghadam court 
looked to the Supreme Court’s statement in Heart of Atlanta Motel that, 
because the Commerce Clause gives Congress “ample power,” 
we have therefore not considered the other grounds relied upon.  This is 
not to say that the remaining authority upon which it acted was not ade-
quate, a question upon which we do not pass, but merely that since the 
commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we have considered 
it alone.
33
 
Using this statement as guidance, the Moghadam court concluded 
that “as a general matter, the fact that legislation reaches beyond the 
limits of one grant of legislative power has no bearing on whether it 
can be sustained under another.”34  As additional support in the Copy-
right Clause context, the court relied upon the Supreme Court’s 1879 
opinion in the Trade-Mark Cases, which held that Congress lacked au-
thority under either the Copyright Clause or the Commerce Clause to 
 
28 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
29 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 247-49 (explaining the challenged provi-
sions of the Act). 
30 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (“[W]e are of opinion, that no 
countenance of authority for the passage of the law in question can be found in either 
the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution; and no other ground 
of authority for its passage being suggested, it must necessarily be declared void, at 
least so far as its operation in the several States is concerned.”). 
31 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250-52 (declaring the decision in the Civil 
Rights Cases “inapposite, and without precedential value in determining the constitu-
tionality of the present Act”). 
32 Id. at 261-62. 
33 Id. at 250. 
34 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).  Section II.B 
of this Comment criticizes this reading of Heart of Atlanta Motel, and subsection III.B.3 
offers a superior interpretation. 
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pass a primitive trademark law.35  The Moghadam court argued that the 
Court’s attention in the Trade-Mark Cases to both the Copyright Clause 
and the Commerce Clause for authority was evidence “that legislation 
which would not be permitted under the Copyright Clause could none-
theless be permitted under the Commerce Clause.”36 
The court conceded, however, that its proposed rule of constitu-
tional interpretation—that each grant of legislative power is alternate 
to all the others—was not absolute, acknowledging the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons.37  In Rail-
way Labor, the Supreme Court held that a law concerning employee 
protection during reorganization of a specific railroad company was 
unconstitutional under the Bankruptcy Clause.38  The Court stated 
that its analysis must begin by determining whether the law at issue 
was an exercise of Congress’s power under the Bankruptcy Clause or 
whether it was an exercise of power under the Commerce Clause.39  
The Court acknowledged that the clauses were “closely related” but 
concluded, after looking to the statute’s legislative history and its sub-
stance, that Congress passed the law under the Bankruptcy Clause.40  
As such, the Court held, the law was subject to the Bankruptcy 
Clause’s uniformity requirement and the Commerce Clause could not 
provide an alternative source of power:  “[I]f we were to hold that 
Congress had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pur-
suant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitu-
tion a limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.”41 
The Moghadam court reconciled Railway Labor with its stated gen-
eral rule of constitutional interpretation by fashioning an exception 
applicable when the statute at issue is “fundamentally inconsistent” 
with the requirements of the narrower constitutional provision.42  The 
court reasoned that because the Copyright Clause’s fixation require-
ment was a malleable concept and the anti-bootlegging statutes pro-
 
35 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94, 99 (1879). 
36 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1278. 
37 See id. at 1279-80 (“But the Railway Labor Executives case suggests that in some 
circumstances the Commerce Clause cannot be used to eradicate a limitation placed 
upon Congressional power in another grant of power.” (citing Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n 
v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982))). 
38 See Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 471-73. 
39 Id. at 465. 
40 See id. at 465-68. 
41 Id. at 468-69.  Part II and Section III.B discuss the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Railway Labor, which is very useful to the inter-clause conflict problem. 
42 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1269. 
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vided copyright-like protection, the criminal anti-bootlegging provision 
was “not fundamentally inconsistent with the fixation requirement of 
the Copyright Clause.”43  The court provided no further guidance on 
how this approach should be applied to other provisions.44 
B.  The Martignon Decisions 
Years after Moghadam, the Second Circuit addressed the constitu-
tionality of the criminal anti-bootlegging provision in United States v. 
Martignon.  First, Judge Baer of the Southern District of New York held 
the criminal anti-bootlegging provision to be unconstitutional.45  On 
appeal, however, the Second Circuit reversed the district court and 
held the anti-bootlegging statute to be a constitutionally valid exercise 
of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.46 
1.  The District Court’s Opinion 
In stark contrast to the Eleventh Circuit in Moghadam, Judge Baer 
used a rule of constitutional interpretation that required classification 
of the statute at issue:  “In order to establish whether the anti-
bootlegging statute is constitutional, it is necessary to determine 
whether the statute is a copyright law or a commercial regulation.”47  
As support for this rule of interpretation, Judge Baer cited the Su-
preme Court’s opinion in Railway Labor.48  Looking to the statute’s leg-
islative history, wording, construction, and substance, Judge Baer con-
cluded that the anti-bootlegging statute was “clearly a copyright-like 
regulation” to be tested under the Copyright Clause, rather than the 
Commerce Clause.49  Judge Baer distinguished the Trade-Mark Cases50 
 
43 Id.   
44 Interestingly, the court noted that the anti-bootlegging statute may be funda-
mentally inconsistent with the Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” requirement—
rather than the fixation requirement—but declined to decide that question because 
the parties had not raised it.  Id. 
45 United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated 
and remanded, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007). 
46 United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2007). 
47 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 419.  The court, at the end of its opinion, offered 
the “fundamentally inconsistent” approach the Moghadam court used as an alternative 
justification for its ruling, see id. at 428-29, but this was not the primary method of con-
stitutional interpretation. 
48 Id. at 420 (citing Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982)).  
For a summary of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Railway Labor, see supra Section I.A. 
49 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 420-22. 
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from the anti-bootlegging statutes:  “Here, unlike in the Trade-Mark 
Cases, the anti-bootlegging statute falls squarely within the purview of 
the Copyright Clause, and therefore, Congress is limited by the re-
strictions that the Copyright Clause imposes on its power.”51  He then 
found the anti-bootlegging law to violate both the Copyright Clause’s 
fixation requirement, because it regulates live, unfixed perfor-
mances,52 and the “limited Times” requirement, because its protection 
lasts indefinitely.53  Thus, using his categorization method of constitu-
tional interpretation, he declared the statute to be unconstitutional.54 
2.  The Second Circuit’s Opinion 
On appeal, the Second Circuit sought to clarify the issue of consti-
tutional interpretation that the anti-bootlegging statutes raise.  After 
exploring the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Heart of Atlanta Motel, the 
Trade-Mark Cases, and Railway Labor, the court presented a bifurcated 
method of constitutional interpretation that it believed clearly synthe-
sized Supreme Court precedent to resolve conflicts between the Copy-
right and Commerce Clauses:  “Congress exceeds its power under the 
Commerce Clause by transgressing limitations of the Copyright Clause 
only when (1) the law it enacts is an exercise of the power granted 
Congress by the Copyright Clause and (2) the resulting law violates 
one or more specific limits of the Copyright Clause.”55  Under this me-
thod of interpretation, for a statute to fall subject to the Copyright 
Clause’s requirements, it must actually be a “copyright law,” rather 
than being merely “like” copyright or “very close” to copyright.56  Us-
ing this framework, the Second Circuit concluded that the criminal 
anti-bootlegging statute was not, in fact, a copyright law and thus was 
not subject to the Copyright Clause’s requirements.57 
The court reached this conclusion based upon a comparative analy-
sis of the Copyright Clause’s grant of power to “secur[e] . . . Right[s],” 
 
50 100 U.S. 82 (1879).  For a summary of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the 
Trade-Mark Cases, see supra Section I.A. 
51 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 427. 
52 Id. at 423-24. 
53 Id. at 424. 
54 Id. at 428. 
55 United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2007). 
56 Id. at 149-50.   
57 See id. at 151 (stating that the statute “is not a law ‘secur[ing] . . . rights,’ nor is it 
a copyright law” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).  Subsection IV.A.1 of this 
Comment criticizes the Second Circuit’s reasoning on this crucial question. 
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the history of the Copyright Clause, and the substance of the criminal 
anti-bootlegging statute.58  After finding the criminal anti-bootlegging 
statute not to be a copyright law, the court held the statute to be a valid 
exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.59  This is the 
most recent case to have decided the issue. 
C.  The KISS Decisions 
In between the district court’s ruling and the Second Circuit’s rul-
ing in the Martignon case, two separate district courts in the Central 
District of California addressed the constitutionality of the civil anti-
bootlegging statute—the only instance of such a challenge to date—in 
the same case.60  KISS Catalog, Ltd., filed a civil suit against Passport In-
ternational Productions, Inc., alleging that the defendant violated the 
anti-bootlegging statute by distributing a DVD containing previously 
unseen footage of a performance by the band KISS from their 1976 
tour.61  In the first opinion, Judge Rea held the civil anti-bootlegging 
statute to be unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause.62  However, 
because of a procedural error in the order, Judge Rea agreed to recon-
sider the case.63  Judge Rea died before he could rehear the case, so the 
case was transferred to the court of Judge Fischer,64 who vacated Judge 
Rea’s order and found the civil anti-bootlegging statute to be constitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause.65 
 
58 See id. at 150-51 (discussing the substance of the anti-bootlegging statute and the 
Copyright Clause’s text and history). 
59 See id. at 152-53 (discussing the nexus between bootlegging and commerce and 
concluding that the statute was within Congress’s authority to regulate interstate and 
foreign commerce). 
60 See KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (KISS I), 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825 (C.D. 
Cal. 2004) (detailing the factual history of the case), vacated in part, 405 F. Supp. 2d 
1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).   
61 See id. at 825 (detailing the factual history of the case).  It is unclear why anyone 
would want such a video. 
62 Id. at 836-37. 
63 See KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc. (KISS II), 405 F. Supp. 2d 
1169, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (explaining that, because the court failed to notify the  
Attorney General of the finding of unconstitutionality, Judge Rea granted a request by 
the United States to rehear the case). 
64 See id. (explaining the death of Judge Rea and subsequent transfer of the case to 
Judge Fischer’s court). 
65 Id. at 1171. 
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1.  The KISS I Opinion 
In his opinion in KISS I, Judge Rea began by determining whether 
the civil anti-bootlegging statute was “copyright-like legislation.”66  
Judge Rea looked to Judge Baer’s analysis of the criminal statute in 
Martignon and concluded that the civil provision was undoubtedly a 
“copyright-related statute” that “seeks to offer copyright-like protec-
tions for recordings of live performances,” even more so than the 
criminal provision.67  Judge Rea then applied the requirements of the 
Copyright Clause to the anti-bootlegging statute.68  Judge Rea ac-
knowledged the difficult question of applying the fixation require-
ment and declined to answer it,69 but ruled that the statute unques-
tionably violated the “limited Times” requirement.70 
Against this backdrop, Judge Rea moved on to the question of 
constitutional inter-clause conflicts and attempted to reconcile the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in the Trade-Mark Cases, Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, and Railway Labor.  Judge Rea distinguished the Trade-Mark Cas-
es and Heart of Atlanta Motel, arguing that neither case implicated a di-
rect conflict between the limitations of the Copyright Clause or 
another power and the Commerce Clause.71  He reasoned that in the 
Trade-Mark Cases, the Court had merely held that “Congress had insuf-
ficient power, under both the Commerce and Copyright Clauses, to 
enact federal trademark legislation,” and in Heart of Atlanta Motel, the 
Court “did not explicitly hold that Congress exceeded its power” un-
 
66 KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 830. 
67 Id.  This is a different line of logic than the Second Circuit would follow in its 
review of Judge Baer’s decision in Martignon.  Judge Rea’s opinion predated the 
Second Circuit’s review by almost three years.  In its review, the Second Circuit decided 
that to fall within the requirements of the Copyright Clause, the statute must be a copy-
right law, rather than being merely copyright-like.  For a discussion of this opinion, see 
supra subsection I.B.2.  Subsection IV.A.1 discusses this crucial question. 
68 KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 831-33.  Judge Rea wrote that the Copyright Clause 
only “contains two limitations with respect to copyright; the Copyright Clause protects 
‘writings’ only ‘for limited Times.’”  Id. at 831 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).  
Some commentators have argued that the Copyright Clause contains other limitations.  
See, e.g., Oliar, supra note 4, at 492-94 (arguing that the Copyright Clause also contains 
limits in its “Authors” term and its statement of purpose to promote the arts). 
69 See KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 832 (“Since the allegedly unauthorized recording 
has already been made, that existing recording may satisfy the fixation requirement.  
Like the Moghadam court, this Court will not attempt to reach a conclusion on this 
question.” (citations omitted)). 
70 See id. at 833 (“Since the Court cannot include a limited term of its own accord, 
the Court holds that the current version of the statute creates perpetual copyright-like 
protection in violation of the ‘for limited Times’ restriction of the Copyright Clause.”). 
71 Id. at 836. 
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der the Fourteenth Amendment.72  He then declared “Railway Labor to 
be the most instructive case on this issue.”73  Following Railway Labor, 
Judge Rea held that the Commerce Clause could not be used to cir-
cumvent the limitations of the Copyright Clause: 
The framers certainly believed that some limit on protection for copy-
rights and patents should exist; otherwise, they would not have included 
the explicit limits contained in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Permitting the current 
scope of the Commerce Clause to overwhelm those limitations altogeth-
er would be akin to a “repeal” of a provision of the Constitution.
74
 
Judge Rea also explicitly rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s “fundamental 
inconsistency” test from Moghadam, arguing that the Moghadam court’s 
parsed reading of the Copyright Clause was misguided and rejecting 
the standard the court used for the fixation requirement.75  Judge Rea 
held the civil anti-bootlegging statute to be unconstitutional.76 
2.  The KISS II Opinion 
On rehearing, Judge Fischer approached the problem far different-
ly, following the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Moghadam almost en-
tirely.  Judge Fischer argued that the Trade-Mark Cases and Heart of At-
lanta Motel stood for the principle that “nothing prohibits Congress 
from protecting similar things in different ways—so long as some provi-
sion of the United States Constitution allows it to do so.”77  She distin-
guished Railway Labor, arguing that the bankruptcy statute in that case 
“was a bankruptcy statute—not a ‘bankruptcy-like’ statute.”78  However, 
the anti-bootlegging statute, according to Judge Fischer, was only “copy-
right-like” or “copyright-related,” and thus “[did] not fall within the 
purview of the Copyright Clause.”79  Judge Fischer also followed the Ele-
venth Circuit’s “fundamental inconsistency” test and argued that the 
anti-bootlegging statute did not “negate any of the purposes of, protec-
tions afforded by, or limitations established by, the Copyright Clause.”80  
She vacated the KISS I order, holding the statute constitutional.81 
 
72 Id.  In Section II.B, I argue that this is the proper reading of both cases. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 837. 
75 See id. at 837 n.11 (responding directly to the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning). 
76 Id. at 837. 
77 KISS II, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
78 Id.  
79 Id. at 1175. 
80 Id. at 1174. 
81 Id. at 1177. 
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II.  ASSESSING THE EXISTING AND PROPOSED METHODS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
As the anti-bootlegging cases and Supreme Court cases like the 
Trade-Mark Cases, Heart of Atlanta Motel, and Railway Labor demon-
strate, there are varying approaches to inter-clause conflicts, the rare 
situations in which a narrow enumerated power overlaps with a 
broader enumerated power.  Unfortunately, courts rarely identify 
their approaches as distinct methods, and even the similar approaches 
vary in both theory and application.  Several commentators have at-
tempted to classify these approaches,82 and in this Part, I offer my own 
classifications.  I have divided the existing approaches into three 
rough categories:  the strict categorization approach, the strictly alter-
native approach, and the fundamental inconsistency approach.  With-
in each of these categories, recognized variances exist.  Furthermore, 
in many instances the cases I have labeled as following a particular 
approach do not fit squarely within the category I have identified; 
courts have often incorporated principles from other approaches or 
justified their decisions under multiple approaches.  Nonetheless, I 
believe the categories I have created represent a concise and useful 
means of analyzing constitutional inter-clause conflicts. 
A.  The Strict Categorization Approach 
In determining whether a statute can be constitutional under a 
broader power, many courts have begun their analysis by determining 
under which singular clause of the Constitution the statute at issue falls 
and then applying only that clause’s requirements and limitations.  This 
approach can be termed the “strict categorization approach.”  Other 
commentators have referred to this approach merely as “categoriza-
tion”83 or placed the approach within a more general label,84 but such a 
generalized view of the approach obscures a characteristic distinct from 
 
82 See e.g., Oliar, supra note 4, at 495-507 (dividing the approaches to resolving  
inter-clause conflicts into five categories); William McGinty, Note, Not a Copyright Law?  
United States v. Martignon and Why the Anti-Bootlegging Provisions Are Unconstitutional, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 323, 332-39 (2008) (arguing that the approaches courts have tak-
en can be divided into three categories:  solitary analysis, categorization, and funda-
mental inconsistency). 
83 See, e.g., McGinty, supra note 82, at 334. 
84 See, e.g., Oliar, supra note 4, at 496-97 (placing the strict categorization approach 
within a larger category Oliar terms “formalism”). 
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other modes of categorization85:  the strict categorization approach re-
fuses to accept that multiple enumerated powers may be applicable to a 
given statute, instead forcing the statute to fit within a singular power. 
Many courts have used the strict categorization approach to resolve 
inter-clause conflicts.  The most notable case to take this approach is 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Railway Labor.86  In Railway Labor, the 
Supreme Court plainly declared:  “[i]t is necessary first to determine 
whether the labor protection provisions of amended RITA are an exer-
cise of Congress’ power under the Bankruptcy Clause, as contended by 
appellees, or under the Commerce Clause, as contended by appellant 
and the United States.”87  Even after acknowledging the close relation-
ship between the Bankruptcy Clause and the Commerce Clause, the 
Court stated that it would look only to the Bankruptcy Clause in its 
analysis, because otherwise, “we would eradicate from the Constitution 
a limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.”88 
Following Railway Labor’s lead, the district court in Martignon be-
gan its analysis by stating that it was first necessary to classify the anti-
bootlegging statute as either a copyright law or a commercial regula-
tion.89  The Second Circuit also followed this approach in its reversal 
of the district court’s decision, concluding that the anti-bootlegging 
statute was not a copyright law and thus judging the statute under the 
Commerce Clause alone.90 
Similarly, both the KISS I and KISS II courts began their analyses 
by determining whether the anti-bootlegging statute was a copyright 
 
85 In this Comment, I propose that such an alternate mode of categorization (a 
“nonstrict” or “liberal” categorization) exists and is the most useful method of constitu-
tional interpretation for resolving inter-clause conflicts.  Thus, the distinction between 
“strict categorization” and categorization more generally is very important.  Part III 
discusses my proposed method of interpretation. 
86 Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).  For a discussion of the 
facts of the case and the analysis in the opinion, see supra Section I.A.  While the Su-
preme Court did, in fact, apply a strict categorization approach, I find that the Court 
nonetheless reached the proper result due to the lack of limitations within the Com-
merce Clause.  See infra note 180. 
87 Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 465. 
88 Id. at 469. 
89 United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated 
and remanded, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007). 
90 See United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We therefore 
conclude that it was not enacted under the Copyright Clause.  We have no need to ex-
amine whether it violates limits of the Copyright Clause and proceed instead to an ex-
amination of its sustainability under the Commerce Clause.”). 
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law or a commercial regulation.91  The KISS I court found that because 
the statute was “copyright-like,” it fell only within the authority of the 
Copyright Clause.92  In KISS II, the court followed a similar approach 
but arrived at a different result, concluding that the anti-bootlegging 
statute did not “fall within the purview of the Copyright Clause, [and 
thus the court] need no longer consider whether it complies with the 
limitations of the Copyright Clause.”93 
The strict categorization approach, while importantly recognizing 
the need to determine the applicability of constitutional clauses, is 
flawed.  The approach operates under the incorrect assumption that 
each statute fits neatly within a single enumerated power.  The strict 
categorization approach ignores the reality that many statutes concern 
more than one realm of constitutional power.  Critics have justly criti-
cized the approach on this ground.94 
This conceptual problem is particularly evident with regard to the 
anti-bootlegging statutes.  The anti-bootlegging statutes concern both 
the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause.95  The district courts 
in Martignon and KISS I advanced the incredulous claim that the 
Commerce Clause is to be ignored when discussing the constitutionali-
ty of the anti-bootlegging statutes.96  The anti-bootlegging statutes sure-
ly meet the low threshold for falling within the realm of the Commerce 
Clause.97  It is impossible to deny that some statutes, particularly the  
anti-bootlegging statutes, fall within multiple enumerated powers. 
 
91 See KISS II, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172-73 (C.D. Cal. 2005); KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 
2d 823, 830 (C.D. Cal. 2004), vacated in part, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).  
92 KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 833-37. 
93 KISS II, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. 
94 See, e.g., McGinty, supra note 82, at 348 (arguing that categorization “has the 
disadvantage . . . of pigeonholing statutes so that they are analyzed under only one part 
of the Constitution, when they may actually relate to several areas of the law”). 
95 My contention here that the anti-bootlegging statutes concern the Copyright 
Clause is controversial, as many courts and commentators have held that the statutes do 
not fall within the realm of copyright.  Part IV fleshes out in greater detail my argument 
that the statutes concern both the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause.  Other 
commentators have expressed concerns similar to my criticism of the strict categoriza-
tion approach.  See, e.g., Oliar, supra note 4, at 496 (arguing that the categorization ap-
proach is weak, particularly in the anti-bootlegging context, because “[t]he sta-
tutes . . . have the characteristics of both intellectual property and foreign commerce”). 
96 See KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 836-37; United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 
2d 413, 424-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated and remanded, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007). 
97 See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274-77 (11th Cir. 1999) (rea-
soning, in great detail, that the criminal provision falls within the Commerce Clause 
because of its “self-evident” link to interstate and foreign commerce). 
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Comparing the anti-bootlegging decisions reveals the other sig-
nificant flaw with the strict categorization approach:  courts follow-
ing the approach can logically reach opposite results by manipulat-
ing the realm of activity that a given enumerated power addresses.  A 
comparison of the district and appellate opinions in Martignon pro-
vides an apt example of this manipulation.  Although the district 
court and the Second Circuit used the same method of constitution-
al interpretation, the courts reached opposite results.  The district 
court placed the criminal anti-bootlegging statute within the Copy-
right Clause category because the statute was “clearly a copyright-like 
regulation.”98  The Second Circuit, however, placed the statute with-
in the Commerce Clause category because it was not a true copyright 
law.99  The crucial difference between the district court’s reasoning 
and the Second Circuit’s reasoning was not the content of the anti-
bootlegging statute itself; rather, the courts actually disagreed over 
the scope of the Copyright Clause category. 
The district court in Martignon construed the realm of the Copy-
right Clause broadly.  Under its construction, any statute that is “copy-
right-like” is categorized as copyright and falls subject to the Copyright 
Clause’s limitations.100  The Second Circuit, however, constructed the 
realm of the Copyright Clause very narrowly.  Under its construction, 
a statute is categorized under the Copyright Clause (and thus subject 
to its requirements and limitations) only if it is a pure copyright law.101  
The statute completely avoids the Copyright Clause’s limitations if it 
does not fall within the narrow definition of copyright, no matter how 
similar the law is to that definition.  This example illustrates that the 
strict categorization approach leaves a crucial question unanswered:  
how broadly should each constitutional clause’s category be con-
strued?  The answer to this question is the turning point in determin-
ing constitutionality, and courts have failed to provide sufficient justi-
fication for one route over another.102 
 
98 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 422. 
99 See United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding 
that the statute is not “a copyright law”). 
100 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 420-22. 
101 Martignon, 492 F.3d at 150-51. 
102 My proposed method of holistic categorization entirely rejects the Second Cir-
cuit’s narrow view that a statute does not fall within the scope of a specific power if it 
approximates the subject matter concerned.  See infra subsection III.B.2. 
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B.  The Strictly Alternative Approach 
In contrast to the strict categorization approach, a different view 
of the Constitution holds that each of its enumerated powers is entire-
ly alternative.  Under this method of constitutional interpretation, a 
statute is a constitutionally valid exercise of congressional authority if 
any power can be found to authorize it, irrespective of any other pow-
ers’ limitations.  If courts applied this method to the anti-bootlegging 
statutes, the statutes would be held constitutional under the Com-
merce Clause, regardless of whether they fall within the realm of the 
Copyright Clause’s authority and regardless of whether they violate 
the Copyright Clause’s requirements. 
Case law does not support the “strictly alternative approach,” a 
relatively extreme interpretation of the Constitution.  At least one 
commentator has argued that the Supreme Court followed the strictly 
alternative approach in Heart of Atlanta Motel,103 but such an argument 
is difficult to make.  In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Supreme Court 
upheld Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin by 
certain classes of business establishments that served the public, as a 
constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause.104  This ruling came more than eighty years after the Civil Rights 
Cases, in which the Supreme Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 
1875 as unconstitutional because Congress lacked authority to pass the 
law under either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment—the only 
sources of authority under which the government argued.105  In Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, the Supreme Court distinguished the 1875 Act from the 
1964 Act and pointed to limiting language in the Civil Rights Cases to 
conclude that the decision was “without precedential value in determin-
ing the constitutionality of the present Act.”106  The Court declined to 
address whether the Act could be sustained under any other provision 
 
103 See McGinty, supra note 82, at 333-34 (arguing that Heart of Atlanta Motel  
represents a clear example of the “solitary analysis approach,” which the author de-
fines as holding that “the statute is constitutionally valid so long as one of the powers 
standing alone is sufficient to uphold it”). 
104 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 247-61 (1964) 
(explaining the details of Title II and holding it constitutional). 
105 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (“On the whole we are of opinion, 
that no countenance of authority for the passage of the law in question can be found 
in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution; and no other 
ground of authority for its passage being suggested, it must necessarily be declared 
void, at least so far as its operation in the several States is concerned.”). 
106 Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250-52. 
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of the Constitution—namely Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment—and instead held the Act valid under the Commerce Clause.107  
To read the Court’s opinion as an endorsement of the strictly alterna-
tive approach, one must understand it to mean that even if the Court 
had found the Civil Rights Act to violate Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it would not matter because the Act was constitutional 
under an alternate source of power—the Commerce Clause.  Nothing 
in the Court’s opinion, however, suggests this. 
A more plausible reading of Heart of Atlanta Motel is not that the 
Court failed to rule whether the Act violated Section 5, but rather that 
the Court declined to address whether the Civil Rights Act fell within 
the scope or realm of Congress’s Section 5 power.108  The Court’s opinion 
supports this reading, since it points to language in the Civil Rights 
Cases stating that the decision was limited to the scope of the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments.109  The Court in the Civil Rights 
Cases reasoned that the action Congress took—the regulation of pri-
vate parties—was not within the scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which the Court held to be limited to regulating state 
action only.110  This nuanced distinction between finding a statute 
beyond the scope of a power and finding a statute to violate a power is 
crucial and must be understood.111  In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court 
determined that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was not within the scope 
of Congress’s Section 5 power.  In effect, the Court would have 
 
107 See id. at 250 (“This is not to say that the remaining authority upon which 
[Congress] acted was not adequate, a question upon which we do not pass, but 
merely that since the commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we have 
considered it alone.”). 
108 This reading of Heart of Atlanta Motel comports with the method of holistic  
categorization I propose in subsection III.B.3. 
109 Id. at 251-52 (quoting the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 18). 
110 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 19 (“What we have to decide is, whether such 
plenary power has been conferred upon Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment; 
and, in our judgment, it has not.”); id. (“And whether Congress, in the exercise of its 
power to regulate commerce amongst the several States, might or might not pass a law 
regulating rights in public conveyances passing from one State to another, is also a 
question which is not now before us, as the sections in question are not conceived in 
any such view.”); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 289 (3d ed. 2006) 
(“The Court also held [in the Civil Rights Cases] that Congress lacked authority to enact 
the law under the Fourteenth Amendment.  In fact, the Court broadly declared that 
the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to government action and that therefore it 
cannot be used by Congress to regulate private behavior.”). 
111 This distinction is inherent in the categorization approach that I have identified 
in its strict form, see supra Section II.A, and propose in modified form, see infra Part III.  In 
the first step of a categorization analysis, one determines whether a statute falls within the 
scope of the power, and in the second step, one determines whether that power is violated. 
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reached the same holding if the government had claimed, for example, 
that the Spending Clause granted Congress authority to pass the law:  
the Court would not have held that the Spending Clause was violated; 
rather, it would have held that it was beyond the Spending Clause’s 
scope.  As a counterexample, had the Act restricted state action—rather 
than private action—but done so beyond what was congruent and pro-
portional to the harm it sought to remedy, the Act would violate Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than exceed its scope.112 
Like Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Trade-Mark Cases113 can be misread as 
endorsing the strictly alternative approach to the Constitution.  In the 
Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court did not follow the strictly alterna-
tive approach and reason that regardless of whether the trademark sta-
tute at issue violated the Copyright Clause, it could plausibly be sus-
tained under the Commerce Clause.114  A proper reading of the Trade-
Mark Cases recognizes that the Court did not even reach the question of 
the requirements of the Copyright Clause, because it concluded that 
the trademark statute did not fall within the realm of the Clause:  “The 
ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or discov-
ery. . . . [W]e are unable to see any such power in the constitutional 
provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and dis-
coveries.”115  Some courts have recognized this important distinction.116 
A true strictly alternative approach would be an extreme and 
deeply flawed interpretation of the Constitution.  The approach 
would eviscerate explicit, unquestionable limitations that the Framers 
included in the Constitution.  This explains why the Supreme Court 
emphatically rejected this approach in Railway Labor: 
 
112 Of course, the doctrine of congruence and proportionality developed long af-
ter the Civil Rights Cases, but this is irrelevant for purposes of my counterexample.  See 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 296-300 (discussing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997), and the doctrine of congruence and proportionality). 
113 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
114 Id. at 95-99.  Subsection III.B.3 of this Comment discusses this reading of the 
Trade-Mark Cases within the context of my proposed method of holistic categorization. 
115 Id. at 94. 
116 See, e.g., United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(“Therefore, the Supreme Court’s analysis [in the Trade-Mark Cases] does not suggest 
that Congress may enact legislation that falls within the purview but not the power of 
the Copyright Clause, under its Commerce Clause authority.  Rather, the Trade-Mark 
Cases establish the non-controversial point that when Congress does not regulate in the 
field covered by the Copyright Clause, it may look to an alternative grant of power.”), 
vacated and remanded, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007); KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 836 
(C.D. Cal. 2004) (“In The Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court held that Congress had 
insufficient power, under both the Commerce and Copyright Clauses, to enact federal 
trademark legislation.”), vacated in part, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).  
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We do not understand either appellant or the United States to argue 
that Congress may enact bankruptcy laws pursuant to its power under 
the Commerce Clause.  Unlike the Commerce Clause, the Bankruptcy 
Clause itself contains an affirmative limitation or restriction upon Con-
gress’ power:  bankruptcy laws must be uniform throughout the United 
States.  Such uniformity in the applicability of legislation is not required 
by the Commerce Clause.  Thus, if we were to hold that Congress had 
the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on 
the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.
117
 
The Supreme Court’s valid criticism of the strictly alternative ap-
proach in the bankruptcy context applies to copyright as well.  If ap-
plied to the copyright context, the strictly alternative approach would 
hold that any copyright law—pure or copyright-like—could avoid the 
limitations of the Copyright Clause altogether and be constitutional 
under the Commerce Clause.  The Copyright Act itself (unquestiona-
bly a copyright law) could be amended to remove all term limits—in 
clear violation of the “limited Times” requirement of the Copyright 
Clause—but still be held constitutional under the Commerce Clause.  
That the Supreme Court did not even mention the possibility of con-
stitutionality under the Commerce Clause in its consideration of the 
constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 is a tes-
tament to the unacceptability of this approach.118 
Under the strictly alternative approach, narrow, limited grants of 
authority that overlap with broad powers would be effectively re-
pealed.  This outcome is unacceptable.  The Constitution’s provisions 
cannot be viewed in a vacuum.  The Constitution establishes an entire 
government, with varying powers and limitations that relate between 
branches and within branches.  For it to have meaning, its provisions 
must be interpreted in light of the other provisions,119 and the strictly 
alternative approach fails to do so. 
C.  The Fundamental Inconsistency Approach 
The “fundamental inconsistency approach” to inter-clause con-
flicts, first used by the Eleventh Circuit in Moghadam,120 attempts to 
 
117 Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-69 (1982) (citations 
omitted). 
118 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (judging the Copyright Term Ex-
tension Act of 1998’s constitutionality under only the Copyright Clause). 
119 Subsection III.B.1 further explores and supports this assertion. 
120 See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding 
the criminal anti-bootlegging provision constitutional because it is “copyright-like” leg-
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remedy the flaws of the strict categorization and strictly alternative 
approaches by treating the Constitution’s clauses as alternative while 
still viewing the Constitution as a whole.  Under the fundamental in-
consistency approach, courts consider the Constitution’s powers in the 
alternative unless there is a “fundamental inconsistency” between a sta-
tute passed under one power and the language or policy of another.  
This approach comes in two forms, which I have identified as the 
“clause-bound form” and the “fundamental policy form.”  Courts have 
used the clause-bound form in the anti-bootlegging context, most not-
ably in the Moghadam decision, and the fundamental policy form out-
side of the anti-bootlegging context.  Commentators have advocated 
for the latter form.  Though this approach is appealing on its face, fur-
ther exploration reveals it to be unacceptably flawed. 
1.  The Clause-Bound Form 
In its clause-bound form, the fundamental inconsistency approach 
looks to the language of the narrow constitutional provision that over-
laps with the broad provision and determines which elements of the 
provision are “constitutive” and which are “limiting.”121  “Constitutive” 
elements of a clause help to define the scope of the clause’s applicabili-
ty; they are used to determine whether a statute falls within a clause’s 
realm.  “Limiting” elements define the requirements of the power; 
they are used to determine whether the clause has been violated.122  
Once the scope of a power has been separated from its requirements, 
courts must determine whether the statute violates those require-
ments and, if so, whether those requirements are fundamental or if 
the statute is otherwise fundamentally inconsistent with the clause. 
The Eleventh Circuit in Moghadam essentially took this approach, 
though it also incorporated elements of the fundamental policy form.  
The court looked to the Copyright Clause and determined that the 
term “Writings,” which is the source of the fixation requirement, de-
fined the scope of the grant of power:  “The grant itself is stated in 
 
islation that “is not fundamentally inconsistent with the fixation requirement of the 
Copyright Clause”); see also Oliar, supra note 4, at 497-98 (“The anti-bootlegging cases 
include a potentially more promising approach to resolving inter-clause conflicts:  the 
fundamental inconsistency test adopted in Moghadam and used by the other anti-
bootlegging courts.”).   
121 Dotan Oliar created the terms “constitutive” and “limiting” to describe the Ele-
venth Circuit’s approach in Moghadam.  See Oliar, supra note 4, at 498. 
122 For a detailed discussion of my distinction between scope of a power and viola-
tion of its requirements, see supra Section II.B. 
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positive terms, and does not imply any negative pregnant that suggests 
that the term ‘Writings’ operates as a ceiling on Congress’ ability to 
legislate pursuant to other grants.”123  After this determination, the 
court concluded that because other legislation had significantly lo-
wered the threshold for fixation, the anti-bootlegging statutes that 
protected unfixed works were not “fundamentally inconsistent.”124 
In his KISS I opinion, Judge Rea astutely criticized the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach, noting that its characterization of the “Writings” 
term as constitutive could not be reconciled with Railway Labor.  He 
wrote, “[T]he uniformity ‘requirement’ is similarly a positive state-
ment and does not necessarily imply a negative pregnant, i.e., the 
Bankruptcy Clause does not state that Congress may not enact non-
uniform bankruptcy laws.”125  But Judge Rea’s criticism of the Eleventh 
Circuit, however valid, is not fatal to the method itself, because it at-
tacks only the Eleventh Circuit’s application. 
Dotan Oliar, however, has offered a valid criticism of the method 
itself.  Oliar essentially argues that the clause-bound form is a fait ac-
compli: 
If qualifying language is characterized as “constitutive,” then harmony 
between it and the statute will be found by assumption:  language that 
does not prevent something does not conflict with it.  But the lack of a 
conflict assuming that language is not limiting cannot serve as a basis for 
concluding that it is not limiting.
126
 
While it is important to recognize the difference between the realm of 
a grant of power and limitations on that grant—as I have emphasized 
in Section III.B and as the clause-bound form also does—this distinc-
tion cannot serve as the dispositive factor in the constitutional inquiry.  
Oliar’s demonstration that the clause-bound form employs circular 
logic is fatal to this form of the fundamental inconsistency approach. 
 
123 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280. 
124 See id. at 1281-82 (concluding that because “fixation, as a constitutional con-
cept, is something less than a rigid, inflexible barrier to Congressional power,” unfixed 
works can be protected pursuant to the Commerce Clause without being “fundamen-
tally inconsistent” with the Copyright Clause).  The court’s consideration of the impor-
tance of fixation—even after it determined that fixation was a constitutive element—is 
more similar to the fundamental policy approach, which subsection II.C.2 will discuss. 
125 KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 n.11 (C.D. Cal. 2004), vacated in part, 405 F. 
Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
126 Oliar, supra note 4, at 498-99. 
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2.  The Fundamental Policy Form 
The fundamental policy form of the fundamental inconsistency 
approach is a marginally more sensible approach to the problem of 
inter-clause conflicts.  In this form, to determine constitutionality one 
looks to the underlying policy values of the narrow, restrictive grant of 
power and determines whether the statute at issue violates or signifi-
cantly undermines those values.  If so, the statute is unconstitutional 
only if the violated policy value is “fundamental.”127 
Although Oliar appears to have entirely distinguished the Ele-
venth Circuit’s approach in Moghadam from the fundamental policy 
form,128 I argue that by weighing the importance of the fixation ele-
ment of the Copyright Clause, the Moghadam court incorporated some 
of the fundamental policy form into its analysis.  The court ruled that 
fixation was not a “rigid, inflexible barrier” in delineating between 
copyrightable works, and thus it was inconsequential that anti-
bootlegging statutes protected unfixed works.129  Implicit in this finding 
was a determination that broadening the scope of protected works to 
include unfixed works did not violate any fundamental value inherent 
in the Copyright Clause.130  As an example of the fundamental policy 
form, commentators typically cite an opinion by a Northern District of 
California court that upheld certain sections of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA)131 as constitutional under the Commerce 
Clause.132  In that case, the court acknowledged that the DMCA provi-
sions at issue threatened certain copyright law values, namely fair use 
and public accessibility, but concluded that those harms did not 
amount to fundamental inconsistency with the Copyright Clause.133 
 
127 See id. at 499 (describing the alternate form of the fundamental inconsistency 
approach, which I have termed “the fundamental policy form”). 
128 See id. at 497-99 (contrasting the fundamental policy form with the Moghadam 
approach).  
129 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281. 
130 See id. at 1281-82 (concluding that because “fixation, as a constitutional con-
cept, is something less than a rigid, inflexible barrier to Congressional power,” unfixed 
works can be protected pursuant to the Commerce Clause without being “fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the Copyright Clause”).   
131 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
132 See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1141-42 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
(holding section 1201(b) to be constitutional). 
133 See id. at 1141-42 (addressing the potential harms of the DMCA and concluding 
that the provisions were not “irreconcilably inconsistent” with the Copyright Clause). 
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Some commentators have promoted this approach to inter-
clause conflicts—and the anti-bootlegging statutes in particular—as 
the superior method of constitutional interpretation.134  To be sure, 
this approach’s view of the Constitution as a whole and its attempt to 
look beyond the text and consider underlying policy values are laud-
able.  The other approaches that I have identified do not possess 
these features. 
However, the fundamental inconsistency approach has its own 
problems.  In its fundamental policy form, the fundamental inconsis-
tency approach asks courts not only to determine the underlying values 
of the Constitution’s provisions, but also to assess their importance.  
The result is that, with no rules of application, explicit provisions of the 
Constitution can be entirely circumvented—held to be virtually mean-
ingless—because they are not considered “fundamental.” 
This is obvious in courts’ and commentators’ application of the 
approach to the anti-bootlegging statutes.  The Eleventh Circuit’s rul-
ing in Moghadam can be read either to excuse nonconformity with the 
fixation term in the Copyright Clause or to remove the fixation thre-
shold entirely as a prerequisite for copyright protection.  Under either 
reading, the court disregarded an entire constitutional term with a 
well-grounded meaning because it did not find it important enough.  
Similarly, William McGinty disregards the fixation requirement entire-
ly in his proposed application of the fundamental inconsistency ap-
proach to the anti-bootlegging statutes, claiming that this is acceptable 
“because of the very wide definition of ‘fixed’ in copyright law.”135  He 
acknowledges that this is the effect of his approach:  “This causes 
some of the limitations in the Copyright Clause, such as the fixation 
requirement, to lose effectiveness.”136 
 
134 See, e.g., Oliar, supra note 4, at 499 (“The fundamental inconsistency test was 
applied more satisfactorily in Elcom. . . . [I]ts approach of examining the degree of 
harm to copyright-related values as means of determining whether a fundamental in-
consistency existed is commendable.”); McGinty, supra note 82, at 339 (“When consi-
dering the constitutionality of the anti-bootlegging provisions, the fundamental incon-
sistency approach is best because it gives teeth to all of the limitations in the Copyright 
Clause but acknowledges the ambiguous position the provisions have between the 
Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause.”). 
135 McGinty, supra note 82, at 348.   
136 Id. at 350.  However, McGinty finds the duration requirement of the Copyright 
Clause to represent a fundamental policy value and thus holds the anti-bootlegging 
statutes unconstitutional under the “limited Times” provision of the Copyright Clause 
alone.  See id. at 349 (“Thus, under the fundamental inconsistency test, § 2319A and 
§ 1101 are unconstitutional due to their perpetual nature.”). 
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Such an argument is unacceptable; the effective repeal of a consti-
tutional provision cannot be tolerated in any constitutional interpreta-
tion.  Furthermore, it is not clear that courts are skilled in determin-
ing the importance of the constitutional provisions at issue.  For 
example, despite the fixation requirement’s low threshold under 
modern copyright law, it has been regarded as serving very important 
policy goals.137  However, in determining that fixation was of little im-
portance, the Eleventh Circuit in Moghadam erroneously looked to the 
definition of “fixed” in the Copyright Act, rather than engaging in a 
constitutional analysis.138  Oliar has noted the potential inadequacy of 
the approach and the ambiguous nature of its application.139 
In sum, the fundamental inconsistency approach—both in its 
clause-bound and fundamental policy value forms—is a beneficial, 
though ultimately unsatisfying, method of resolving inter-clause con-
flicts.  Its application is ambiguous, and more importantly, its end re-
sult—that entire limitations contained in the Constitution can be dis-
regarded as unimportant—is unacceptable.  Nonetheless, the 
approach offers useful features.  Most importantly, it necessitates a ho-
listic view of the Constitution, which considers the policy values un-
 
137 See, e.g., JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 64 (explaining that Congress considered 
fixation to be one of two “fundamental criteria of copyright protection” in passing the 
Copyright Act (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51-53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664)).  Wendy Gordon also emphasized the central importance of 
the fixation requirement in copyright law:   
[A]n interdependent world requires demarcations to avoid paralysis and pre-
serve valuable, mutually beneficial reciprocities. . . . Physical boundaries pro-
vide one important limit.  Copyright provides its own boundaries which, by 
and large, substitute well for physical boundaries, both in regard to promoting 
transactions and to keeping liability within tolerable limits.   
 First among these substitute boundaries are copyright’s fixation and demar-
cation requirements. 
Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright:  The Challenges of Consistency, 
Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1380 (1989). 
138 See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 1999).  The 
KISS I court noted this error in the Moghadam court’s reasoning:  “[T]he Eleventh Cir-
cuit surprisingly relied on a constitutionally untested definition of ‘fixed’ in Title 17 to 
argue that fixation may occur simultaneously with transmission and thus has few 
boundaries.  It is unclear why Congress’ definition of ‘fixed’ informs the constitutional 
definition of fixation since these are distinct inquiries.”  KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 
837 n.11 (C.D. Cal. 2004), vacated in part, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
139 See Oliar, supra note 4, at 499 (“Elcom can be criticized for its assessment of the 
DMCA’s copyright-related costs and benefits.  It also did not explain when an inconsis-
tency would be ‘fundamental.’”). 
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derlying the Constitution’s provisions.  This perspective is necessary to 
a successful method of constitutional interpretation. 
III.  A PROPOSED METHOD OF ANALYSIS:  HOLISTIC CATEGORIZATION 
As demonstrated in Part II, the methods that courts and commen-
tators have used to determine the constitutionality of statutes when an 
inter-clause conflict exists are lacking.  In this Part, I propose a me-
thod of analysis for resolving inter-clause conflicts that I term “holistic 
categorization.”  This method draws from the advantages of existing 
methods of analysis, yet avoids the flaws of those methods.  First, I 
present holistic categorization in detail.  Second, I offer a justification 
and defense of the method, showing that the holistic categorization 
approach fits with a proper account of the Constitution, avoids many 
of the flaws of the existing methods of analysis, and even comports 
with Supreme Court precedent. 
A.  The Method of Holistic Categorization 
To determine the constitutionality of a statute in the context of  
inter-clause conflicts, I propose a method of analysis in which an intui-
tive two-step process is undertaken.  First, a court should determine 
within which of the Constitution’s clauses the statute at issue falls.  
Second, a court should apply the limitations and underlying policy 
considerations of all of the applicable clauses to the statute.  This me-
thod can appropriately be termed “holistic categorization,” because it 
takes a categorical approach to statutes and a deeply holistic view of 
the Constitution. 
The first step of holistic categorization is to identify the constitu-
tional clause—or clauses—under which the statute at issue is to be 
analyzed.  This is a “modified categorization” based on the strict cate-
gorization approach that courts have applied in the past.140  My mod-
ification to this approach entails considering the scope or realm of a 
granted power before looking to the limitations of that power to de-
termine whether the statute at issue falls within it.  In considering the 
realm of a power’s control, rules of definition that are strict and form-
alistic cannot be used.  While the conception must be grounded in the 
language of the Constitution’s clause, it should not turn on the pars-
ing of sentence structure into “constitutive” and “limiting” terms to 
 
140 For a discussion and analysis of the strict categorization approach, see supra 
Section II.A. 
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establish a rigid definition, as the clause-bound form of the funda-
mental inconsistency approach attempts to do.141  Instead, to deter-
mine the proper realm of a power’s control, one must look to the sub-
ject matter that the clause concerns, the legislative action that the 
clause is designed to address, and the underlying policy of the clause. 
Once a court considers these factors and forms a concept of scope, 
it must determine whether the statute falls within that scope.  In doing 
so, the direct legislative action should be considered, disregarding an-
cillary effects.  Beyond the direct action taken, the court should also 
consider the legislative history, intent, and statutory construction.  Sta-
tutes that approximate the subject matter the constitutional clause 
controls—for example, “copyright-like” statutes—may fall within the 
scope of the clause.  Finally, the court should recognize that statutes 
may fall within the scope of more than one constitutional clause. 
In the second step of holistic categorization, the court should ap-
ply all of the limitations of the clauses identified in the first step to the 
statute at issue.  Unlike under the fundamental inconsistency ap-
proach, the relative worthiness of the limitations should not be consi-
dered;142 rather, the limitations and restrictions explicit in the clause 
should be strictly applied.  The court may also assess the policy con-
cerns underlying the clause at issue to determine whether the statute 
is contrary to those policy objectives.  If a statute violates a clause with-
in which it falls, the statute should be held unconstitutional.  Similar-
ly, if a statute significantly undermines the policy objectives of a clause 
within which it falls, it should also be held unconstitutional. 
B.  Justification 
The holistic categorization approach that I have proposed is, in 
many ways, a synthesis of the useful features of existing methods that 
eschews many of the flaws in those methods.  Important principles of 
constitutional interpretation that the Supreme Court and noted 
commentators have identified guide the approach. 
1.  The Holistic View of the Constitution 
Holistic categorization is, unsurprisingly, grounded in a holistic 
view of the Constitution.  The approach endorses an account of the 
 
141 For a discussion and analysis of the clause-bound form of the fundamental in-
consistency approach, see supra subsection II.C.1. 
142 For a discussion of the fundamental inconsistency approach, see supra Section 
II.C. 
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Constitution—and particularly Congress’s enumerated powers—as 
not merely a collection of grants, commands, and limitations, but as 
a document that is greater than the sum of its parts.  It recognizes 
that in assessing the constitutionality of a given statute, one cannot 
read each constitutional clause independently of the others.  Any 
view of a constitutional grant of authority must bear in mind other 
related provisions of the Constitution.  Laurence Tribe, among oth-
ers, endorses the holistic view: 
 Read in isolation, most of the Constitution’s provisions make only a 
highly limited kind of sense.  Only as an interconnected whole do these 
provisions meaningfully constitute a frame of government for a nation of 
states. . . . Like any blueprint of a complex architectural edifice, more-
over, the whole constituted . . . is plainly more than the sum of its parts.  
There is no way to avoid at least some reading between the lines if one is 
to make coherent sense of the edifice in its entirety.
143
 
The holistic perspective is not an entirely novel principle of inter-
pretation, as it tracks closely with canons of statutory interpretation.144  
This view should be distinguished from the view the strict categoriza-
tion, strictly alternative, and to an extent, fundamental inconsistency 
approaches implicitly take.  Both the strict categorization approach and 
the strictly alternative approach consider the Constitution’s provisions 
in a vacuum, applying only the limitations and grants contained in one 
clause without considering other clauses that may apply.145  The funda-
mental inconsistency approach does recognize the interrelatedness of 
the Constitution’s provisions.146  However, because the approach only 
allows the limitations of one provision to inform the analysis of constitu-
tionality under an alternate provision when it considers those limita-
tions “fundamental,” the approach does not commit itself as strongly to 
the holistic view of the Constitution as holistic categorization does. 
 
143 Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:  Reflections on Free-Form 
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1235-36 (1995). 
144 See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 46:5 (7th ed. 2009) (“A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts 
or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent.  Consequently, each 
part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section to 
produce a harmonious whole.  Thus, it is not proper to confine interpretation to the 
one section to be construed.” (footnote omitted)).  In fact, the entire holistic categori-
zation approach parallels well-established doctrines of statutory interpretation, particu-
larly because it applies all relevant, specific limitations to the statute under examina-
tion.  See infra subsection III.B.2. 
145 See supra Sections II.A and II.B. 
146 See supra Section II.C. 
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2.  The Two-Step Analysis 
The detailed two-step analysis I propose follows established prin-
ciples of constitutional interpretation.  It also draws from the useful 
features of existing methods of interpretation while avoiding many of 
their drawbacks. 
A modified categorization, the first step in the holistic categoriza-
tion analysis, is necessary in any serious method of interpretation.  Any 
assessment of the constitutionality of a given statute must involve some 
form of categorization.  Before determining whether constitutional  
authority exists or is violated, one must know where in the Constitution 
to look for it.147  The modified categorization that I have proposed, 
however, recognizes the flaws in an analysis that sets strict rules to create 
a rigid definition of the scope or realm of a statute.148  The modified ca-
tegorization instead identifies several important factors that should be 
used to form a general conception, rather than a rigid definition, of the 
realm with which the constitutional clause concerns itself.  Doing so ac-
knowledges that clauses in the Constitution differ in their language, 
underlying policy, and structure:  some contain preambles; others con-
tain clear, strict limitations; and others contain no limitations at all.  
With such variance, any attempt to create a strict set of rules to clearly 
define a clause’s realm will create more problems than it will solve. 
Once the scope or realm of a clause’s authority has been concep-
tualized, the holistic categorization approach proceeds to determine 
whether the statute at issue falls within that scope.149  By considering 
the direct action of the statute, rather than its ancillary effects, the  
holistic categorization approach acknowledges that the Constitution 
grants Congress a wide array of powers and means to achieve its objec-
tives.  In this way, the approach also recognizes that in some circums-
tances, ends may not be prohibited simply because certain means are. 
 
147 Thus, the strict categorization approach is not the only approach to apply some 
form of categorization.  The strictly alternative approach requires one to determine in 
which constitutional clauses the statute at issue can find authority.  Likewise, when us-
ing the fundamental inconsistency approach, one must determine which clause’s limi-
tations and policies apply before determining whether fundamental limitations or pol-
icy are violated. 
148 The strict categorization approach and the clause-bound form of the funda-
mental inconsistency approach revealed the flaws of such an approach.  See also Oliar, 
supra note 4, at 496-97 (criticizing “formalistic argumentation”). 
149 The modified categorization approach accepts that some statutes fall within 
more than one constitutional clause and thus avoids the criticism that the strict catego-
rization approach pigeonholes statutes into a single category.  See supra Section II.A. 
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The Supreme Court has used such a principle of constitutional in-
terpretation, most notably in South Dakota v. Dole.150  In Dole, the Court 
held that Congress could use its Spending Clause power to provide 
strong incentives for states to raise their drinking ages to twenty-one 
years, even though the Twenty-First Amendment prohibited Congress 
from setting a drinking age directly.151  In its reasoning, the Court ex-
plained:  “[O]bjectives not thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated 
legislative fields’ may nevertheless be attained through the use of the 
spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.”152  The  
holistic categorization approach to inter-clause conflicts adopts this im-
portant principle, which courts and commentators have not considered. 
Perhaps most importantly, the holistic categorization approach  
entirely rejects the Second Circuit’s ruling in Martignon that a statute 
cannot fall within the scope of a specific power if it approximates, yet is 
not entirely, the exact subject matter concerned (e.g., it is “copyright-
like”).153  Such statutes can—and in most cases should—be determined 
to fall within the scope of a clause and thus be subject to its limitations. 
This rule of interpretation takes guidance from the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of the Lanham Act154 in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox Film Corp.155  In Dastar, the Court rejected an argument that 
the Lanham Act accorded “special treatment to communicative prod-
ucts [because such a construction] causes the Lanham Act to conflict 
with the law of copyright, which addresses that subject specifically.”156  
The Court cited an earlier opinion holding that “‘[i]n general, unless 
an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright protects an 
item, it will be subject to copying.’”157  Most notably, the Court ex-
pressed a concern that allowing a cause of action under the Lanham 
Act “would create a species of mutant copyright law.”158  The Court went 
 
150 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
151 See id. at 212 (“Even if Congress might lack the power to impose a national min-
imum drinking age directly, we conclude that encouragement to state action . . . is a 
valid use of the spending power.”). 
152 Id. at 207 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 
(1936)).  Although the Court’s rule in Dole concerned Congress’s spending power, 
there is no reason that one cannot derive a broader principle regarding the distinction 
between prohibited ends and means.  As discussed in subsection III.B.3, this broader 
principle comports with the Court’s ruling in Heart of Atlanta Motel as well. 
153 See supra subsection I.B.2. 
154 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
155 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
156 Id. at 33. 
157 Id. (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)). 
158 Id. at 34 (emphasis added). 
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on to explain that a Lanham Act cause of action would violate the du-
ration requirement of the Copyright Clause.159 
Courts and commentators have wrongly ignored this important 
case.  Dastar stands for the proposition that “copyright-like” statutes 
must fall subject to the requirements of the Copyright Clause.  To 
hold, as the Second Circuit did, that such statutes may instead be con-
stitutional under the Commerce Clause is to create the very “mutant 
copyright law” against which the Supreme Court warned. 
Finally, the second step of the holistic categorization analysis ap-
plies all limitations that the relevant clauses contain, regardless of 
whether a court considers them “fundamental.”  This rule is derived 
from the Supreme Court’s clear objective of enforcing the Constitu-
tion’s explicit limitations.  The Court made this objective evident with 
respect to the Copyright Clause in Dastar160 and more generally in 
Railway Labor.  In Railway Labor, the Court insisted on applying the un-
iformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause, even though one 
could certainly label the statute at issue a commercial regulation.161  
To do otherwise “would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation 
on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.”162 
The holistic categorization approach recognizes that the Constitu-
tion’s limitations must be given force.  This view comports with the 
fundamental rules of statutory interpretation.  In 2009, the Supreme 
Court stated that “one of the most basic interpretive canons” is that 
“‘[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provi-
sions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insig-
nificant.’”163  Thus, the principle is well-grounded, even though it has 
been ignored by the fundamental inconsistency approach, which even 
its proponents admit allows some constitutional provisions to lose 
their effectiveness.164  Furthermore, holding all of the Constitution’s 
limitations as necessary avoids the more pragmatic problem of courts 
misjudging the importance of constitutional limitations.165 
 
159 See id. at 37 (“To hold otherwise would be akin to finding that [the Lanham Act] 
created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do.”). 
160 See id. 
161 Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-69 (1982). 
162 Id. at 469. 
163 Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1566 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 
542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)) (alteration in Corley). 
164 See supra subsection II.C.2. 
165 Subsection II.C.2 discusses this criticism of the fundamental inconsistency 
approach. 
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3.  Reconciliation with Supreme Court Precedent 
In their attempts to determine the proper method of analyzing  
inter-clause conflicts, the anti-bootlegging courts have looked primari-
ly to the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Trade-Mark Cases,166 Heart of 
Atlanta Motel,167 and Railway Labor.168  In many instances, the courts had 
difficulty reconciling these cases.169  The holistic categorization ap-
proach that I present fits comfortably within the Supreme Court’s rea-
soning in these three cases. 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in the Trade-Mark Cases fits within 
the holistic categorization approach’s first step.  The Court essentially 
held the trademark statute at issue to fall outside both the scope of 
the Copyright Clause170 and the scope of the Commerce Clause.171  
Translating this decision into the language of the holistic categoriza-
tion approach, the Supreme Court established a conception of the 
realms that the Copyright Clause and Commerce Clause controlled 
and then found the trademark statute to fall outside of these realms.172  
The second step of the analysis was unnecessary, as there were no limi-
tations to apply.  The statute was unconstitutional. 
One can similarly apply the holistic categorization approach to 
the Court’s decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel.173  As discussed, the most 
plausible interpretation of the Court’s decision in light of the Civil 
Rights Cases,174 which the Court elected not to revisit, is that it consi-
dered the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to be outside the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment and within the scope of the Commerce Clause.175  
This account fits well within the holistic categorization approach. 
In holistic categorization terms, the Supreme Court held in the 
Civil Rights Cases that the scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
 
166 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
167 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
168 Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982). 
169 See, e.g., United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999) (not-
ing that “there is some tension between” the cases). 
170 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94 (“[W]e are unable to see any such power in 
the constitutional provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and 
discoveries.”). 
171 Id. at 95-99 (reasoning that the trademark statute falls outside the scope of the 
authority granted by the Commerce Clause). 
172 For a more detailed account of the Trade-Mark Cases opinion, see supra notes 
113-14 and accompanying text. 
173 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
174 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
175 See supra text accompanying notes 103-10. 
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Amendment was limited to federal regulation of state action to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment.176  Looking to the direct action of 
the Civil Rights Act—the regulation of private parties, not state  
action—the Court held that the Act could not be categorized as a Sec-
tion 5 law.177  The Court endorsed this interpretation in Heart of Atlan-
ta Motel, holding that the motivation of ending racial discrimination 
was permissible so long as the Constitution authorized the means—the 
direct action—that Congress took.178  Thus, the holistic categorization 
approach would follow a similar analysis for the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and find it to be outside the scope of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment but constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 
Finally, the holistic categorization approach perfectly aligns with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Railway Labor.179  In Railway Labor, the 
Supreme Court effectively followed the holistic categorization approach 
without using the terms I propose.180  In finding the statute at issue to 
fall within the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause, the Court looked to the 
 
176 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (“Individual invasion of individual rights is 
not the subject-matter of the amendment.  It has a deeper and broader scope.  It nulli-
fies and makes void all State legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures them in 
life, liberty or property without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the 
equal protection of the laws.”). 
177 See id. at 24-25 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not authorize the 
Civil Rights Act). 
178 In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Court stated: 
That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many of these areas 
rendered its enactments no less valid.  In framing Title II of this Act Congress 
was also dealing with what it considered a moral problem.  But that fact does 
not detract from the overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that racial 
discrimination has had on commercial intercourse.  It was this burden which 
empowered Congress to enact appropriate legislation, and, given this basis for 
the exercise of its power, Congress was not restricted by the fact that the par-
ticular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing was also 
deemed a moral and social wrong. 
379 U.S. at 257. 
179 Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).  For a more detailed 
discussion of the facts of the case and the Court’s opinion, see supra Section I.A. 
180 Earlier in this Comment, I described the Court’s decision as falling within the 
strict categorization approach.  See supra Section II.A.  This is because although the 
Court acknowledged the overlap between the Commerce Clause and the Bankruptcy 
Clause, see Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 468-69, it declined to categorize the statute at issue as 
both a bankruptcy statute and a commerce statute.  The holistic categorization  
approach would include the formality of characterizing the statute as falling within 
both powers.  However, with respect to these two constitutional clauses, there is no 
practical difference, since the approach applies the limitations in all applicable clauses 
and the Commerce Clause contains no express limitations. 
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same sources and factors I suggest:  the substance of the statute and its 
direct action, its legislative history, and the underlying policy of the 
constitutional clause at issue.181  Once the Court determined that the 
statute fell within Congress’s bankruptcy power, it applied the Bank-
ruptcy Clause’s uniformity limitation—as the holistic categorization ap-
proach would do—and held the statute unconstitutional.182 
IV.  APPLYING HOLISTIC CATEGORIZATION TO  
THE ANTI-BOOTLEGGING STATUTES 
With the holistic categorization approach now clearly established, 
it can be applied to the specific inter-clause conflict this Comment has 
highlighted—that created by the anti-bootlegging statutes Congress 
passed as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA).183  Sec-
tion A of this Part applies the first step of the holistic categorization 
approach, modified categorization, to the anti-bootlegging statutes.  It 
finds that both the civil and criminal statutes approximate a form of 
copyright protection and fall within the scope of both the Copyright 
Clause and the Commerce Clause.  Section B of this Part applies the 
second step of the holistic categorization approach, which concerns 
limitations of the applicable clauses.  When the Copyright Clause’s  
limitations are applied to the anti-bootlegging statutes, it becomes 
clear that the statute violates the clause’s durational requirement, as 
well as perhaps the clause’s fixation requirement.  Because the statutes 
violate at least one constitutional limitation, they are unconstitutional. 
A.  Categorizing the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes 
1.  Conceptualizing the Copyright Clause’s Realm 
The holistic categorization approach begins by using the rele-
vant constitutional clauses to form a conception of the realms in 
which the clauses operate.  The anti-bootlegging statutes implicate 
the Copyright Clause, so it will be the primary focus of the inquiry.184  
The Copyright Clause empowers Congress “[t]o promote the 
 
181 See Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 467-69 (addressing the statute’s substance, the sta-
tute’s legislative history, and the policy of the Bankruptcy Clause). 
182 Id. at 469-73. 
183 The civil anti-bootlegging provision is found at 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006), and 
the criminal provision is found at 18 U.S.C. § 2319A. 
184 Subsection IV.A.3 of this Comment makes the uncontroversial determination 
that the anti-bootlegging statutes fall within the very broad realm of the Commerce 
Clause. 
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Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries.”185  Several factors are involved in establishing a 
conception of the Copyright Clause. 
One must first consider the subject matter that the clause con-
cerns.  The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]o comprehend the 
scope of Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause, ‘a page of his-
tory is worth a volume of logic.’”186  History reveals that Congress has 
used the Copyright Clause to protect a wide range of subject matter, 
which has expanded over time.187  Perhaps the best conception of the 
Copyright Clause’s focus is simply the copying of original, “intangible 
products of the mind.”188 
Second, the analysis turns to the type of congressional action with 
which the Copyright Clause is concerned.  The Copyright Clause au-
thorizes Congress to “secur[e] . . . exclusive Right[s].”189  In Martignon, 
the Second Circuit understood this phrase to mean “to create, bestow, 
and allocate . . . rights” and based its entire constitutional analysis on 
this interpretation.190  The court’s analysis of what rights the Copyright 
Clause concerned centered on its comparison of the criminal anti-
bootlegging statute to the existing Copyright Act.191  This line of rea-
soning is erroneous, however, because the question is not the scope of 
rights that Congress has decided to secure through the Copyright Act, 
but rather the scope of rights that the Constitution authorizes Con-
gress to secure.192  There simply is not enough information available to 
define precisely what it means to secure rights to authors.  In the case 
of the Copyright Clause, one can consider the type of action specified 
in the clause, but that certainly cannot serve as the sole guidepost in 
construing the scope of the Copyright Clause. 
 
185 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
186 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003) (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 
256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.)).  
187 See generally JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 14-25 (tracing the history of Anglo-
American copyright law from the Statute of Anne, through the Copyright Act of 1909, 
to the Copyright Act of 1976). 
188 Id. at 3. 
189 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
190 United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 150 (2d Cir. 2007). 
191 See id. at 151. 
192 See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 1.07 (“The Copyright Clause of the 
Constitution vest [sic] in Congress the authority to enact copyright legislation, but 
does not in itself command that copyright legislation must be enacted.  Congress is 
given discretion whether in fact to enact such legislation, and if so, as to its scope.”). 
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However, the third factor to be considered in forming a concep-
tual scope of the Copyright Clause, the underlying purpose or policy 
of the clause, is very useful.  Understanding the purpose of copyright 
is essential to forming a conception of the clause’s scope.  This is be-
cause the Copyright Clause is one of the only constitutional provisions 
that contains a policy statement.  The clause states that the purpose of 
Congress’s power is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”193  One must consider the inclusion of this policy statement—
which makes clear that more than the simple creation of private 
property rights guides Congress’s copyright power194—in forming a 
conceptual scope of the Copyright Clause. 
The importance of this policy is evident in the history of copyright 
law in the United States.  American copyright law is unique in that the 
overarching social policy contained in the Copyright Clause constantly 
guides it.  As Joyce and coauthors explain, “U.S. copyright law has 
been conceived as an instrument of national cultural policy, rather 
than a mere scheme of private rights.  From its inception, it has been 
the vehicle for the balancing of private proprietary claims and the 
public interest in access to information resources.”195  Joyce and coau-
thors further explain that this underlying social policy has more than 
“rhetorical significance”; rather, it has shaped the modern copyright 
doctrine and is at the root of the language of the Copyright Clause.196  
In particular, this public policy is the source of the “limited Times” 
provision.197  Because the Copyright Clause embodies such a strong, 
important social policy, one must construe its scope broadly. 
2.  Determining Whether the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes Fall Within 
the Scope of the Copyright Clause 
With a general conception of the scope of the Copyright Clause 
established, it must now be determined whether the anti-bootlegging 
 
193 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
194 See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 19 (“The constitutional language—which 
does not even employ the term ‘copyright’—seems to suggest that the dominant pur-
pose of the Framers was to promote the creation (and, by implication, the dissemina-
tion) of knowledge, so as to enhance public welfare.  This goal is to be achieved 
through provision of an economic incentive:  a monopoly right given for ‘limited Times,’ 
whose direct beneficiary is the ‘Author.’”). 
195 Id. at 988. 
196 Id. 
197 See id. (“Where copyright doctrine is concerned, it has had an important ge-
nerative influence.  It explains the ‘limited Times’ language of the constitutional Copy-
right Clause.”). 
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statutes fall within that scope.  The holistic categorization approach 
considers several factors in making this determination.  Three of these 
factors are relevant to the anti-bootlegging statutes:  what the statute 
directly does, legislative history and congressional intent, and statutory 
construction.  Consideration of these three factors makes clear that 
the anti-bootlegging statutes closely resemble copyright law. 
Analyzing the substance of the anti-bootlegging statutes—what 
they directly do—is the most difficult.  Although the statutes are, in 
many ways, different from traditional copyright law, they nonetheless 
afford copyright-like protection.  Nimmer and Nimmer reason that 
under the statutes, musical performances “are accorded something 
approximating, but not equaling, copyright protection.”198  They note 
that the anti-bootlegging statutes confer rights that are “comparable” 
to those conferred by traditional copyright:  the right to control unau-
thorized reproductions and the right to public distribution.199  Fur-
thermore, the anti-bootlegging statutes also “confer[] a limited 
right—communication of a live musical performance,” which occupies 
an odd place within traditional copyright law.200  It should be noted 
here that the Second Circuit erroneously reasoned that a criminal 
provision could not be a copyright law.201  The Copyright Act itself 
provides numerous criminal penalties for copyright infringement 
that—like the criminal anti-bootlegging provision—parallel its civil 
protections.202  In fact, the Uruguay Round Agreements, the agree-
 
198 See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8E.03[B][1]. 
199 See id. (“Two of the rights belonging to traditional copyright proprietors are to 
control unauthorized reproductions and public distributions of their works.  Chapter 
11 accords comparable rights.” (footnotes omitted)). 
200 Id.  Nimmer and Nimmer state, “That right is broader than the comparable 
right given to sound recordings, which lack any performance component.  By contrast, 
it is narrower than the right conferred on, for example, musical works, rights in which 
are not limited to live performance.”  Id. 
201 See United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (“It is a crimi-
nal statute, falling in its codification . . . between the law criminalizing certain copy-
right infringement and the law criminalizing ‘trafficking in counterfeit goods or ser-
vices.’  It is, perhaps, analogous to the law of criminal trespass.  Rather than creating a 
right in the performer him-or [sic] herself, it creates a power in the government to 
protect the interest of performers from commercial predations.”).  It is surprising that 
the Second Circuit even acknowledged other criminal copyright laws, because the exis-
tence of such laws defeats the court’s argument.  It is also interesting that in its analy-
sis, the court never mentioned that Congress passed the criminal provision in conjunc-
tion with the civil provision, which is nearly identical and falls under the same title as 
the Copyright Act.  See supra text accompanying notes 5-9. 
202 See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 915-17 (detailing the Copyright Act’s numer-
ous criminal penalties); see also McGinty, supra note 82, at 343-44 (disagreeing with the 
Second Circuit’s reasoning on this ground). 
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ments that Congress implemented through the anti-bootlegging sta-
tutes, explicitly mandate that signatories “shall provide for criminal 
procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of will-
ful . . . copyright piracy on a commercial scale.”203 
That one of the anti-bootlegging statutes carries criminal penalties 
is inconsequential to the analysis of whether the statutes fall within the 
scope of the Copyright Clause.  Looking only to the substance of the 
statutes, it is apparent that while they do not give the full range of pro-
tections offered by modern copyright law, they nonetheless resemble 
some form of traditional copyright protection. 
Turning next to the legislative history of the anti-bootlegging sta-
tutes, there is no doubt that until their constitutionality was scruti-
nized, all involved considered the statutes to be intellectual property 
laws.  Congress enacted the statutes as part of the URAA, which 
adopted the TRIPs, a massive international intellectual property trea-
ty, into law.204  The very name of the treaty with which the statutes 
were passed to comply—the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights—strongly suggests that the anti-
bootlegging statutes are within the realm of the Copyright Clause.  If 
this evidence is somehow insufficient, the statutes’ legislative history 
supports the conclusion as well.205 
Considering the anti-bootlegging provisions’ statutory construc-
tion similarly points towards placing the statutes within the category of 
copyright.  As the district court in Martignon noted, the civil anti-
bootlegging provision is located within the same title of the United 
States Code as the Copyright Act, “almost as a sub-set of the Copyright 
Act.”206  The criminal anti-bootlegging provision appears in the United 
States Code in the same title as, and immediately following, the crimi-
nal copyright-infringement provision.207  On top of all of this, the sta-
 
203 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra 
note 8, art. 61. 
204 See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, at § 8E.01[B] (“In 1994, the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act added to the picture a very brief Chapter 11, consisting of only 
one section.  That section regulates the unauthorized fixation and trafficking in sound 
recordings and music videos. . . . In order to comply with the obligations of the United 
States as a signatory to the TRIPs annex to the World Trade Organization Agreement, 
Congress added this protection for such performances.” (footnotes omitted)).  
205 See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 420-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(detailing numerous passages in the statutes’ legislative history that make clear that 
these statutes—and the URAA more generally—were considered copyright laws), va-
cated and remanded, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007). 
206 Id. at 421. 
207 See id. at 421-22. 
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tute explicitly adopts the definitions of the Copyright Act208 and makes 
available “most civil remedies of copyright law.”209 
Almost all courts and commentators seem to agree that the anti-
bootlegging statutes provide at least “copyright-like” protections.210  
Some commentators have argued, however, that because the statutes 
do not provide full, traditional copyright protection, they cannot be 
considered copyright laws.211  There are several serious flaws in this 
line of reasoning. 
First, the argument makes the common mistake of judging the sta-
tutes by comparing them to the Copyright Act.  As discussed above, 
the proper inquiry is whether the statutes fall within the constitution-
al—not statutory—scope of copyright.  While the detailed provisions 
of the Copyright Act are useful in this analysis, comparisons to it 
should not be determinative. 
Second, to accept these commentators’ arguments is to complete-
ly disregard a legislative history and statutory construction that point 
strongly in favor of categorizing the anti-bootlegging statutes as copy-
right laws.  While these factors should not be determinative, when 
they point this strongly, they ought not be ignored. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, to accept these commenta-
tors’ arguments is also to disregard the important social policy under-
lying the Copyright Clause.  To place laws that do not entirely repro-
duce modern copyright law outside of the Copyright Clause turns the 
clause’s underlying policy on its head.  It would mean that the Consti-
tution, rather than identifying a narrow group of intellectual works as 
important enough to warrant copyright protection, instead makes this 
group more difficult to protect.  Allowing all “copyright-like” laws to es-
 
208 See id. at 422 (“And, the ‘Definitions’ provision of the anti-bootlegging statute, 
rather than defining crucial terms, such as ‘fixed,’ ‘musical work,’ and ‘sound record-
ings,’ adopts the definitions of these terms as stated in Title 17—the Copyright Title.” 
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(e) (2006))). 
209 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8E.03[B][2][a]. 
210 See, e.g., Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 420-22 (“Based on the anti-bootlegging sta-
tute’s language, history, and placement, it is clearly a copyright-like regulation.”); KISS I, 
350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 830 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“This Court does not believe there can be 
much debate that § 1101 is a copyright-related statute.”); Brian Danitz, Comment, Mar-
tignon and KISS Catalog:  Can Live Performances Be Protected?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1181 (2005) (characterizing the statutes as “quasi-copyright”). 
211 See, e.g., Mandell, supra note 9, at 700-03 (arguing that, although the anti-
bootlegging statutes “closely mirror the reproduction and distribution rights” of the 
Copyright Act, they are “outside the scope of the Copyright Clause”); Danitz, supra 
note 210, at 1180-83 (arguing that the anti-bootlegging statutes fall outside of the 
Copyright Clause). 
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cape the requirements of the Copyright Clause creates the very “spe-
cies of mutant copyright law” that the Supreme Court warned against 
in Dastar.212  To prevent such an anomaly, the anti-bootlegging statutes 
must fall within the scope of the Copyright Clause and be subject to its 
limitations. 
3.  Determining Whether the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes Fall Within 
the Scope of the Commerce Clause 
One unique feature of the holistic categorization analysis is that it 
allows statutes to fall within the scope of more than one constitutional 
power.  Courts must thus determine whether the anti-bootlegging sta-
tutes fall within another clause of the Constitution, namely the Com-
merce Clause.  Fortunately for this analysis, the Commerce Clause’s 
broad authority is well-established.213  In United States v. Lopez, the Su-
preme Court held that the clause grants Congress the authority to re-
gulate activities that “substantially affect interstate [or foreign] com-
merce.”214  This is the scope of the Commerce Clause. 
In the case of the anti-bootlegging statutes, it is very easy to con-
clude, as the Eleventh Circuit in Moghadam did in its excellent analy-
sis, that the regulated subject matter substantially affects interstate 
commerce.  As the Moghadam court correctly noted, “[t]he link be-
tween bootleg compact discs and interstate commerce and com-
merce with foreign nations is self-evident.”215  There are myriad con-
nections to interstate and foreign commerce.216  Beyond these, 
however, one need only look to the history of the anti-bootlegging 
statutes to see the obvious connection to interstate, and particularly 
foreign, commerce.  Congress enacted the anti-bootlegging statutes 
as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which implemented 
 
212 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003); see 
also supra subsection III.B.2. 
213 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 242 (“Practically speaking, [the Commerce 
Clause] has been the authority for a broad array of federal legislation, ranging from 
criminal statutes to securities laws to civil rights laws to environmental laws.”). 
214 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). 
215 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 1999). 
216 See, e.g., id. (“Bootleggers depress the legitimate markets because demand is 
satisfied through unauthorized channels. . . . [P]erforming artists who attract bootleg-
gers are those who are sufficiently popular that their appeal crosses state or national 
lines.  The very reason Congress prohibited this conduct is because of the deleterious 
economic effect on the recording industry.” (citation omitted)). 
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the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property protocol.217  It is 
nonsensical to claim that the anti-bootlegging statutes, passed pur-
suant to the World Trade Organization’s authority, do not affect 
commerce and thus to deny that the anti-bootlegging statutes fall 
within the Commerce Clause’s broad scope.218 
B.  Applying the Relevant Limitations to the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes 
Under the holistic categorization analysis, once a court deter-
mines that the anti-bootlegging statutes fall within the scope of both 
the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause, the court must apply 
the limitations of those clauses.  The Supreme Court has stated that 
the Commerce Clause does not “contain[] an affirmative limitation or  
restriction upon Congress’ power.”219  By contrast, the Copyright 
Clause does contain limitations.  Thus, only the Copyright Clause is 
relevant at this stage of the analysis.220  Like most courts and commen-
tators, I will focus on the Copyright Clause’s duration and fixation re-
quirements in this Section, although some commentators have sug-
gested that additional limitations in the Copyright Clause exist and 
should be applied to the anti-bootlegging statutes.221  It is obvious that 
granting perpetual protection violates the Copyright Clause’s duration 
requirement, and it is probable, although less certain, that the anti-
bootlegging statutes protect unfixed works and thus violate the Copy-
right Clause’s fixation requirement. 
 
217 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, su-
pra note 8, art. 7 (setting the objectives of the agreement as protecting and enforc-
ing intellectual property rights “to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare” 
(emphasis added)). 
218 See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8E.05[A] (“Given how broadly the 
reach of [the Commerce Clause] has been construed, it would be difficult to maintain 
that accords mandated by the World Trade Organization fall outside the type of trade 
and commerce that Congress can legitimately regulate.” (footnote omitted)). 
219 Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468 (1982). 
220 See id. at 467-72 (contrasting the Commerce Clause with the Bankruptcy Clause). 
221 See, e.g., Oliar, supra note 4, at 489-95 (contending that the anti-bootlegging 
statutes, when tested against the “Writings” term, the “limited Times” term, the “Au-
thors” term, the “Progress” language, and the originality requirement, may violate the 
Copyright Clause’s restrictive grant of power). 
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1.  Applying the “Limited Times” Requirement 
The Copyright Clause states that in securing rights to authors, 
Congress must give such rights “for limited Times.”222  The Supreme 
Court has held that any protection granted under the Copyright 
Clause must, at some point, end.223  Because the anti-bootlegging  
statutes do not include a statement of duration (i.e., when the protec-
tions will expire), the statutes violate this very basic limitation.  On this 
question, courts and commentators agree almost unanimously.224 
The notable exception to this virtual unanimity is Brian Danitz, 
who argues that the anti-bootlegging statues are consistent with the 
“limited Times” requirement “because a live performance is inherently 
limited in duration.”225  Dotan Oliar has sufficiently responded to this 
faulty reasoning, noting that Danitz ignores the anti-bootlegging sta-
tute’s prohibitions on broadcasting and trafficking, which are perpe-
tual, and ignores these statutes’ infinite retroactive application, as 
shown by the KISS litigation.226  The anti-bootlegging statutes plainly 
violate the “limited Times” requirement under the Copyright Clause 
and are thus unconstitutional. 
2.  Applying the Fixation Requirement 
The Copyright Clause empowers Congress to protect authors’ 
“Writings.”227  The Supreme Court has held this term to mean that 
copyright protection can only be extended to “any physical rendering 
of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”228  A recorded 
musical performance falls within this requirement.229  The question of 
 
222 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
223 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199-200 (2003) (recognizing that the Copy-
right Clause requires that the duration of a copyright be “appropriately ‘limited’”). 
224 See Oliar, supra note 4, at 491 & n.127 (“The overwhelming majority of courts 
and commentators suggest that the anti-bootlegging statutes violate the limited times 
requirement.”). 
225 Danitz, supra note 210, at 1198-99. 
226 See Oliar, supra note 4, at 491-92. 
227 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
228 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973); see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 9, § 1.08[C][2] (“[I]n order for a work to constitute a writing, it must be 
embodied in some tangible form.  If the word ‘writings’ is to be given any meaning 
whatsoever, it must, at the very least, denote ‘some material form, capable of identifica-
tion and having a more or less permanent endurance.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2004))). 
229 See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561-62 (stating that a recorded musical performance 
“may” satisfy the fixation requirement). 
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whether the anti-bootlegging statutes violate this requirement is more 
difficult than the duration question.  Most courts and commentators 
that consider the requirement relevant believe the anti-bootlegging 
statutes violate the fixation requirement because they protect unfixed 
works, such as live musical performances.230 
This reasoning has one glaring flaw:  the performances that the  
anti-bootlegging statutes protect have been fixed—by the infringer.  
After all, if an audience member heard a live performance one 
night, committed it to memory, and then perfectly recreated the 
performance later, either on record or live, she would not violate the 
anti-bootlegging statutes.  Judge Rea recognized this nuanced dis-
tinction in KISS I.231 
The argument that infringement can satisfy the fixation require-
ment raises interesting questions.232  If courts accepted the argument, 
the threshold for fixation, already extremely low, would reach the brink 
of meaninglessness.  This question may ultimately need to be decided 
on policy grounds.  For the fixation requirement to retain any meaning, 
a line must be drawn.  This debate, however, is moot with respect to the 
anti-bootlegging statutes:  the statutes are clearly unconstitutional un-
der the Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
The Constitution’s complex structure grants the federal govern-
ment many powers—both broad and narrow in scope—and restricts 
the exercise of those powers.  When two grants of power conflict, a 
 
230 See, e.g., Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 423-24 (holding that the criminal anti-
bootlegging statute violates the fixation requirement).  See generally Joseph C. Mer-
schman, Note, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause:  Halting the Commerce 
Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress’s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV. 661 (2002) 
(arguing that the anti-bootlegging statutes clearly violate the fixation requirement of 
the Copyright Clause and that this limitation cannot be circumvented). 
231 KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“Since the allegedly unau-
thorized recording has already been made, that existing recording may satisfy the fixa-
tion requirement.”), vacated in part, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
232 The Copyright Act requires the work’s author to authorize fixation.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “fixed” to mean fixed “by or under the authority of the 
author”).  Whether such authorization is constitutionally required is a separate question.  
One interesting answer that future study might explore is that the term “their” in the 
Copyright Clause requires authorization:  if fixation is only accomplished by an in-
fringer, a “Writing” cannot rightly be considered to belong to the author.  See U.S. 
CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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fundamental question of constitutional interpretation arises.  Such a 
situation rarely occurs, but the anti-bootlegging statutes present a per-
fect model for understanding and confronting the constitutional 
question of inter-clause conflicts. 
In this Comment, I presented various judicial and scholarly app-
roaches to inter-clause conflicts, demonstrating their inadequacies 
while highlighting their useful features.  I offered my own proposal, 
“holistic categorization,” as a plausible solution. 
I do not offer this approach as a panacea.  Rather, I acknowledge 
that the approach may possess its own flaws.  For example, by eschew-
ing strict rules in favor of a multitude of factors that are weighed diffe-
rently on a case-by-case basis, the holistic categorization approach 
might be faulted for being unpredictable.  Nonetheless, I argue that 
this approach is the best means of analyzing inter-clause conflicts.  In 
fact, a lack of predictability may be beneficial.  If courts assert consti-
tutional limitations, Congress may be forced to consider whether it 
possesses the authority to undertake actions before legislating, rather 
than assuming that its power is unlimited (as it appears to have done 
with respect to the anti-bootlegging statutes).233  The approach may 
also force Congress to consider whether the action it wishes to take 
aligns with the policy objectives underlying the Constitution’s grants 
of power, and this surely cannot be viewed as a negative outcome. 
My hope is that this Comment contributes to the emerging legal li-
terature on inter-clause conflicts.  As scholars debate this difficult issue, 
useful thoughts and methods continue to emerge.  My analysis has far 
from exhausted the topic.  Additional questions, such as whether the 
practical effect of holistic categorization will be beneficial from a legis-
lative, judicial, or even societal standpoint and whether other possibili-
ties for inter-clause conflicts exist, are open to future examination.  My 
hope is that this Comment will take the debate one step further, forc-
ing courts and commentators to consider difficult issues of constitu-
tional limitations and underlying policy and adding another voice to 
the longstanding discussion of the Constitution and its limitations. 
 
233 At the start of the 112th Congress, the House of Representatives amended its 
rules to require a member who introduces legislation to submit “a statement citing as 
specifically as practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the Constitution 
to enact the bill or joint resolution.”  H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted).  Such 
a statement from the sponsor of legislation would certainly be a useful, though far 
from determinative, consideration in the holistic categorization analysis.  One can 
wonder whether Congress might have given thought to the constitutional limitations of 
the Copyright Clause had this rule been in effect at the time of the anti-bootlegging 
statutes’ passage. 
